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Territorial nationalism and Arctic geopolitics: Iceland as an Arctic
coastal state
Klaus Doddsa* and Valur Ingimundarsonb
aDepartment of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London, UK; bFaculty of History
and Philosophy, School of Humanities, University of Iceland, Iceland
This paper explores the cultural and political signiﬁcance of being acknowledged
and recognized as an “Arctic coastal state”. Using Iceland as a case study, we
consider how coastal state status had grown in signiﬁcance as the Arctic Ocean
has been re-imagined more as a polar Mediterranean and less as a frozen desert.
By drawing on Michael Billig’s work on banal nationalism and popular geopoli-
tics, the manner in which the ideas and practices associated with a “coastal state”
are reproduced in elite and everyday contexts. However, we conclude by noting
that thus far this appeal to Iceland as “coastal state” has gained greater traction
within the Icelandic Foreign Ministry and Parliament, and it remains to be seen
whether it will have a more popular resonance with Icelandic citizens. Whatever
the future, it is a timely reminder that terms such as “coastal state” are caught up
in national and even circumpolar identity projects.
Keywords: coastal state; Iceland; Arctic Ocean; banal nationalism; popular
geopolitics
Introduction
Consequently, the geographical situation of Iceland in the efﬂuent of the Arctic Ocean
therefore, makes her very vulnerable to any sudden change in the marine ecosystem
whether from climate change or pollution. It therefore doesn’t come as a surprise that
the present government of Iceland has declared the Arctic as one of the main priorities
of our foreign policy.
As a sovereign state, that is the only one lying in its entirety within what the govern-
ment of our hosts [i.e. Norway] deﬁnes as the High North, and with the land and vast
areas, as well as huge interests, within the Arctic, it is stating the obvious that we con-
sider ourselves an Arctic Coastal state. Obviously we want to be recognised as such.
In this context, the concept is not deployed in a narrow, legal sense conﬁned to territo-
rial claims. I use it as a political and geographical argument to drive home the point,
not without reason, that we want to be included, not excluded, from deliberations on
the Arctic region.1
If something either “doesn’t come as a surprise” and/or is “obvious” then why bother
to state it in the ﬁrst place? Unwittingly, perhaps, the aforementioned extract of a
speech by the Foreign Minister of Iceland, Össur Skarphéðinsson, provides
*Corresponding author. Email: k.dodds@rhul.ac.uk
1Skarphéðinsson, “Icelandic Perspectives on the Arctic.”
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something worth a second glance with regard to Iceland being conceptualized and
recognized as a “coastal state” – hence the reference to the dialectic of inclusion and
exclusion. Skarphéðinsson opined that the term “coastal state”, at least to interna-
tional lawyers, is more often than not related to the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).2 It is seen as entailing a series of rights, obligations
and responsibilities in territorial seas, exclusive economic zones and the extended
continental shelves. His arresting reference to the place of Iceland in the “efﬂuent of
the Arctic Ocean”, however, also highlights how geographical metaphors and analo-
gies are signiﬁcant in the ways in which the Arctic region (and those within it) is
represented and reworked in a variety of texts including ministerial speeches.
Efﬂuent in particular, with its emphasis on the act of “ﬂowing out”, has also been
routinely used, at least from the nineteenth century onwards, to refer to industrial
waste. It is, on the face of it, a rather disturbing description to posit about Iceland
and perhaps works as a warning as much as an opportunity for how the country’s
geographical relationship to the Arctic Ocean might be used to build, develop and
proclaim itself as an Arctic “coastal state”. In other words, it reﬂects not only a
desire to be counted as a decision-maker (on and about the region), but also concerns
about the potential impact of environmental pollution (in and around the Arctic).
We focus here on how “coastal states”, in the context of the Arctic Ocean and
adjacent seas, enumerate and act upon their roles before internal and external audi-
ences. Our interest is with the iterative and performance-based aspects of being a
coastal state, not only in maritime areas, such as the Arctic Ocean, but also in Arc-
tic geopolitics, and as part of national identity politics.3 In short, we want to draw
attention to the relationship between imaginative geographies (including the use of
geographical metaphors and analogies) and foreign policies and performances/prac-
tices of states – something the Icelandic Foreign Minister acknowledged when he
invoked the existence of “a political and geographical argument” and “deliberations
on the Arctic region.”4 For in making those assertions, the Icelandic Foreign
Minister, unwittingly perhaps, reminds us that these claims and deliberations offer
up not only an inferential structure with which to consider, but also a pathway for
better understanding how political elites in the Arctic region reason about their
national and circumpolar interests, and enact them.
Our article is a theoretical intervention, which is concerned with what we might
consider to be “Arctic geopolitics” and its relationship with territorial nationalism.5
It explores how categories such as “coastal state” are embedded in temporal, spatial,
political, affective and everyday contexts.6 We contend that these forms of
2Koivurova “Actions of the Arctic States,” 211–12.
3For a longer essay on some of the theoretical implications see J. Dittmer et al., “Have you
heard the one about the disappearing ice?”
4See Luiza Bialasiewicz et al., “Performing Security,” 408. On the making of an Arctic
region, see C. Keskitalo “Region-Building in the Arctic: Inefﬁcient Institutionalization? A
Critical Perspective on International Region-Building in the Arctic,” http://isanet.ccit.arizona.
edu/noarchive/keskitalo.html.
5For a recent exposition on the importance of territory, see S. Elden, Terror and Territory
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010).
6This is clearly a larger project than this paper alone, with the purpose of “ﬂagging up” that
categories such as “coastal state” perform far more material and affective labour than is cur-
rently acknowledged by international lawyers and political scientists as well as Senior Arctic
Ofﬁcials attached to the Arctic Council, for example.
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territoriality vary in intensity, depending on wider political events and agendas per-
taining in and to the Arctic region. Using Iceland as a case study, we acknowledge
that the manner in which claims to being a “coastal state” also vary in terms of
engagement and reception. There are times when governments and citizens can be
deeply “moved” by the notion of being a “coastal state” with distinct resource and
strategic issues including ﬁshing and the possibility of extending sovereign rights
over the seabed.7 At the very least, there are domestic and international audiences
to consider and internal variations therein.
Talking about “a coastal state”
While Tracy Chapman once “talked” about “a revolution”, we conﬁne ourselves
(and far less lyrically) to “a coastal state”. The term “coastal state” is not just a
legal-judicial category; it is something, as political leaders such as the Canadian
Prime Minister Stephen Harper note, to be promoted, popularized and securitized
within existing circuits of territorial nationalism.8 It has, in other words, cultural,
political and geographical connotations and resonances. In successive Speeches
from the Throne in the Canadian Parliament, Harper’s conservative government has
reiterated that the country has to “defend Canada’s Arctic sovereignty […] Canada
has a choice when it comes to defending our sovereignty in the Arctic. We either
use it or lose it […] because Canada’s Arctic is central to our identity as a northern
nation.”9 In the 2010 Speech from the Throne, Harper put it this way:
Our government will continue to vigorously defend Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. It will
continue to map our northern resources and waters. It will take action to increase marine
safety and reduce pollution from shipping and other maritime trafﬁc. Our government
will also work with other northern countries to settle boundary disagreements.10
So without referring to “coastal state” directly, nonetheless, there is a palatable
sense in which Canada’s Arctic sovereignty cannot simply be taken for granted on
the basis of geographical proximity and/or international legal conventions. Indeed,
whether it be the Icelandic Foreign Minister or the Canadian Prime Minister, politi-
cal leaders often appear to articulate, and, indeed, perform in ways – whether in
southerly capital cities or northerly locations – that give some purchase to media
framings of the Arctic region as being caught up in a “scramble for resources and
access.” Thus, paradoxically, they urge their own citizens and other internal and
external stakeholders who are listening and watching not to believe over-hyped
speculation that Arctic territories and resources are going to be exploited by oppor-
tunistic others, while at the same time trying in Harper’s words to “excite” citizens
about the Canadian North.
7Illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) ﬁshing is one area that deserves further attention
especially how it is mobilized to pursue national-territorial projects in the name of defending
“our ﬁsh” or pursing those who imperil “our ﬁsh stocks.”
8On general concerns regarding securitizing the Arctic, see Kraska, Arctic Security in an Age
of Climate Change. And on the geographies of securitization, see Ingram and Dodds, Spaces
of Security and Insecurity.
9Canada, Speech from the Throne, 2007. Available at: http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/QPeriod/
20071016/thronespeech_SIDEBARS_071016/
10Canada , Speech from the Throne, 2010. Available at: http://www.speech.gc.ca/eng/media.
asp?id=1388
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In Michael Billig’s terms, the “habits of language” routinely help to ﬂag up
(polar) nationalism in a banal and everyday manner. Apart from using words such
as “Arctic” and “Canada”, Harper’s use (to take one example before returning to
our Icelandic focus) of the “our”, “we” and “the” also play an important role in nat-
uralizing geographical interest in northerly territories, onshore and offshore – in
other words asking domestic citizens to accept as a consequence why it is so neces-
sarily to “vigorously defend” something that was never actually disputed in terms
of legal ownership. “Habits of language” are, however, only one element in recent
Canadian government pronouncements on Arctic sovereignty. References to
“action” and “work” also highlight not only discursive labour but also the very real
material investment in resource evaluation, continental shelf delimitation, training
exercises, surveillance and environmental protection measures. Being a coastal state,
as the argument goes when political leaders are urging the need for greater invest-
ment and commitment, is expensive and time-consuming. The waters in question,
extending 200 nautical miles from the coastal baseline, have to be evaluated,
mapped, monitored and patrolled. Throughout Harper’s tenure, there have been con-
stant reiterations of the need to invest in new ships, including icebreakers, improve
surveillance capability through schemes such as the Northern Watch (operative in
the Northwest Passage) and the ongoing collection of geological and oceanographic
material necessary for a continental shelf submission to the UN Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) before 2014.11
In the case of Iceland, the subject of this article, we have a potentially rich case
study of a country eager to remind its Arctic partners and a domestic audience of
its geographical connections to the Arctic. Unlike Canada, however, Iceland’s status
as an Arctic Ocean coastal state is uncertain, in the sense that it is widely assumed
that there are only ﬁve Arctic Ocean coastal states – Canada, Denmark/Greenland,
Norway, Russia and the United States. This was perhaps most evident in the text
accompanying the Ilulissat Declaration (May 2008) in which the given Arctic Five
(A5) reiterated their belief that
the law of the sea provides for important rights and obligations concerning the delin-
eation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environ-
ment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientiﬁc research,
and other uses of the sea. We remain committed to this legal framework and to the
orderly settlement of any possibly overlapping claims. This framework provides a
solid foundation for responsible management by the ﬁve coastal States and other users
of this Ocean through national implementation and application of relevant
provisions.12
As was widely reported at the time, other members of the Arctic Council –
namely, Iceland, Finland and Sweden – were unhappy that the Declaration appeared
to relegate them to the status of “other users” in the context of the Arctic Ocean.13
11For a concise description of the delimitation process and the role of the Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) see Koivurova “Actions of the Arctic States,”
217–19.
12Ilulissat Declaration, 28 May 2008, arctic-council.org/ﬁlearchive/Ilulissat-declaration.pdf.
13It is worth noting that when Iceland held the chair of the Arctic Council (2002–04) there
was no discussion of the “coastal state” because Icelandic ofﬁcials were not, at that point,
concerned that a select number of “coastal states” were later to organize and issue a declara-
tion in May 2008.
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This was particularly relevant in the case of Iceland, which protested vigorously
against being excluded.14 It also helps explain why the Icelandic Minister of For-
eign Affairs used his annual report to the national parliament in May 2010 to call
for a new Arctic policy that would stress Iceland’s status as a “coastal state”.15 In a
parliamentary resolution on Iceland’s Arctic policy, which was passed in May 2011,
it was noted that the 12 principles underlying this policy included the following:
Securing Iceland’s position as a coastal state within the Arctic region. Promoting
understanding of the fact that the Arctic region extends both to the North Pole area
proper and the part of the North Atlantic Ocean, which is closely connected to it.16
The parliamentary resolution and the speech, quoted above, by the Icelandic
Foreign Minister can be seen as part of a discursive production of imaginative
geographies enacted through performativity. As Mark Salter17 has argued, the per-
formativity of borders increasingly resemble Judith Butler’s idea of stylized repeti-
tion of acts within a regulatory frame.18 If sovereignty, like gender, has no essence,
it must be articulated and re-articulated through reiterations and ritualizations. The
Icelandic speech act ﬁts well with recent scholarly emphasis in critical geopolitics
on looking at borders as moving in two directions simultaneously: to sites inside
sovereign territory and offshore,19 that is, within ﬁxed spaces as well as external
and provisional ones, which are “in a state of becoming.”20 It is meant to remind
domestic and international audiences – through a recasting of an already existing
discourse and practice on and of Iceland as a prima facie Arctic state – of the coun-
try’s coastal state credentials. To put it differently, the Icelandic government is
doing what Salter terms “performing the border” by resisting and recasting the
hegemonic geopolitical narrative of the Arctic Five and their geographical represen-
tation of the Arctic Ocean region – Iceland after all wants to be part of an Arctic
Six rather than be excluded by an Arctic Five.21
The argument is based on the notion that the Arctic region stretches from the
central Arctic Ocean to the northern extremes of the Atlantic Ocean. And since Ice-
land’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extends well into the arctic Greenland Sea
as an outlaying portion of the Arctic Ocean, its status as a coastal state should be
acknowledged and recognized. In addition, Iceland wants to see the Arctic Council,
with its eight permanent members and representatives of Arctic “indigenous
peoples” (permanent participants), as the primary intergovernmental and decision-
making forum for Arctic affairs.22
14In part explaining the subsequent importance of Iceland hosting a jointly organized semi-
nar with NATO on Security Prospects in the High North on 29 January 2009, http://www.
mfa.is/publications/aifs/nr/4801.
15Report of Icelandic Minister for Foreign Affairs, 10 May 2010, http://www.mfa.is/media/
Skyrslur/Executive-summary.pdf.
16See Icelandic Foreign Ministry, “Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy.”
17Johnson et al., “Interventions on Rethinking the Border,” 62.
18Butler, Gender Trouble, 43–4.
19See Johnson et al., “Interventions on Rethinking the Border,” 65.
20See, for example, Walters, “Secure Borders, Safe Havens, Domopolitics;” Bigo, “When
Two Become One.”
21Johnson et al., “Interventions on Rethinking the Border,” 65.
22See Ingimundarson, “Territorial Discourses and Identity Politics.”
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The purpose, to be sure, is not to challenge the international governing frame-
work for the Arctic continental shelf. Rather, it provides evidence of how speciﬁc
governments recognize that the framework is assembled and distributed amongst
parties. The Icelandic government fully supports UNCLOS and is a party to it.
Thus, it is not a question of contesting the rights of the Arctic Five to submit
claims to CLCS based on Articles 76 and 77 of UNCLOS. These articles permit an
extended EEZ where continental shelves extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the
baselines. And unlike the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway and Denmark/
Greenland, Iceland makes no territorial claims in the Arctic Ocean proper – in terms
of islands and other territories capable of generating territorial seas, exclusive eco-
nomic zones and the like. According to a 1981 agreement with Norway, it enjoys
continental shelf rights in the joint exploitation area between Iceland and Jan
Mayen in the Greenland Sea.23 An agreement in principle was also reached with
Denmark on behalf of Greenland on its claim to continental shelf rights beyond
200 nautical miles in the southern part of the Banana Hole near the Faroe Islands
in 2006. Finally, Iceland lays claim to the utilization of resources in the waters
around Svalbard on the basis of the equality principle of the 1920 Svalbard
Treaty.24
But the Icelandic government is primarily thinking of the neorealist and geopo-
litical consequences of the establishment of an Arctic Five hegemonic regime in the
Arctic, especially the re-territorialization of the Arctic Ocean, in the name of
national security and resource extraction, on the one hand, and by invoking
environmental stewardship on the other. As the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration stated:
By virtue of their sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in large areas of the
Arctic Ocean the ﬁve coastal states are in a unique position to address these possibili-
ties and challenges […] The Arctic Ocean is a unique ecosystem, which the ﬁve
coastal states have a stewardship role in protecting. Experience has shown how ship-
ping disasters and subsequent pollution of the marine environment may cause irrevers-
ible disturbance of the ecological balance and major harm to the livelihoods of local
inhabitants and indigenous communities.25
What Iceland wants to “highlight” is the need, on its part at least, to prevent the
territorial aspirations of the Arctic Five from being turned into an ownership and
management claim to the Arctic Ocean proper as a narrowly deﬁned and self-
contained geographic area, with minimal connection to its surroundings or adjacent
seas.26 Needless to say, such an exclusivist policy could have deep impact on
Iceland, whose dependence on ﬁshing (a highly mobile resource) is crucial for its
subsistence, with ﬁsh being responsible for 40% of its export revenues. Despite its
23For a recent analysis, see Y. Tanaka “Reﬂections on Arctic Maritime Delimitations: A
Comparative Analysis between the Case Law and State Practice,” Nordic Journal of Interna-
tional Law 80 (2011): 459–84.
24This has been controversial, as Norway has been accused of trying to constrain the rights
of foreign registered vessels to ﬁsh off Svalbard waters. See D. Anderson, “The Status
Under International Law of the Maritime Areas Around Svalbard,” Ocean Development and
International Law 40 (2009): 373–84.
25Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 9.
26See Ingimundarson, “Territorial Discourses and Identity Politics.”
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population of only 320,000, Iceland is one the world’s largest “ﬁshing nations”,
which has been involved in at times tense negotiations with neighbouring states and
regional organizations (especially the EU) over ﬁshing quotas in North Atlantic
waters.27 When it comes to the management of migratory, trans-boundary and strad-
dling ﬁsh stocks in the Arctic region, Iceland is, thus, keen on ﬁghting any attempts
to establish an international ﬁshery management organization, which sidelines major
stakeholders. So while the term “efﬂuent” might have been an odd word-choice by
the Icelandic Foreign Minister, it represented the Arctic as being connected to other
oceans including the Atlantic and suggested a more expansive understanding of an
“Arctic region” more generally.
Territorial nationalism and everyday polar geopolitics
In recent years, there has been a proverbial explosion of interest in the contempo-
rary Arctic.28 While this region can be mapped and deﬁned in a variety of ways,
primary attention has focused on the Arctic Ocean itself, rather than the area north
of 60° North. Underlying this concern is the changing geographies of this ice-
covered body of water, leading to concern that diminishing sea ice is facilitating a
more disturbing future – one based on the spectre of conﬂict over resources and
environmental disaster as ever more interested parties (especially extra-territorial
actors) seek to maximize their individual and collective advantage. A combination
of ongoing climate change, resource potential, new shipping routes and the security
concerns of the Arctic Five are frequently cited as constitutive of a new polar poli-
tics, where Arctic waters are both a space of and for geopolitics. Apart from two
high-proﬁle meetings in Ilulissat, Greenland, in 2008 and Chelsea, Canada, in 2010,
the Arctic Five have formalized their cooperation in many ways through unpubli-
cized meetings on issues ranging from territorial claims and energy to ﬁsheries.
What was initially billed as a complementary venue, with the Arctic Council
continuing to be seen as the primary Arctic forum, is, in other words, being silently
institutionalized – at least, this is what critics of the Arctic Five fear.
Contemporary narratives deploy a series of geographical assumptions and desig-
nations that help to conjure up the Arctic Ocean as a geopolitical space. By drawing
on the critical geopolitical literature, we examine how geographical claims and
assumptions animate political debates and practice.29 Whether acknowledged or not,
all analyses of international affairs draw upon a reservoir of common-sense-based
geographical assumptions about, for example, the position and role of a state in the
world. This concern for the role of geographical common sense usefully highlights
that these geographical assumptions may work at a variety of interconnected socie-
tal levels, from the formal reasoning of intellectuals of statecraft and think-tank
commentators to the practical and popular modes of reasoning deployed by political
leaders and media organizations respectively.
Michael Billig’s Banal Nationalism, since its publication in 1995, has proven
fecund as a coterie of geographers, sociologists, historians, political scientists and
27One such case involving a dispute over mackerel quotas is discussed in N. Williams “New
Fishing Battle Looms,” Current Biology 20 (2010): 689–90.
28See the discussion in Anderson, After the Ice: Life; M. Byers, Who Owns the Arctic?;
Emmerson, Future History of the Arctic; Fairhall, Cold Front; Howard, Arctic Gold Rush.
29For an overview see Dodds, Kuus, and Sharp, Ashgate Companion to Critical Geopolitics.
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others continue to engage with its claims.30 It is a testimony to the book’s appeal
that it now seems de rigueur to attend to the production, dissemination and negotia-
tion of the national through discourse and practices, including, as Billig noted, the
unremarked-upon features of everyday life, such as a ﬂag ﬂuttering from a public
building. The notion of the unremarked or, as Billig noted “the double neglect”,
continues to resonate with scholars.31 With reference to the neglectful, Billig con-
tended that existing scholarship (produced in the 1980s and early 1990s) remained
beguiled by the more extreme forms of nationalism and, thus, tended to conceive of
nationalist discourses and practices as extraordinary and exceptional, especially
when writing either about independence movements and/or events such as the
break-up of Yugoslavia. Moreover, if there was an interest in the extreme forms of
nationalism, attention tended to turn towards particular parts of the world where
nationalist aspiration had yet to ﬁnd some kind of culmination. The net result was
to “shut down” conversations about nationalism within the Euro-American world,
especially the United Kingdom and the United States, which tended to be portrayed
as more settled in that regard unless reference was made to, say, nationalist groups
such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland. But the assumption
appeared to be that this was either unusual and/or out of kilter with the general
post-nationalist trend.
The second aspect of this “neglectful” relationship was a tendency to forget that
expressions of national identity need to be understood as a “form of life which is
lived daily in a world of nation-states.”32 However, Billig argued that if this “form
of life” was so entrenched, it was likely that symbols such as “the national ﬂag”
would no longer register in a signiﬁcant manner. The daily practices, which help to
reproduce a nation, perhaps then go unnoticed or at least unremarked upon in
everyday conversations even among foreign ministers and senior civil servants. The
end result is that both the hanging ﬂag and the speech acts become part of the taken
for granted. As Jan Penrose reminded us in the early 1990s, “Our acceptance of
nations as natural divisions of the global territory and population is essential to the
maintenance of the existing geopolitical order.”33 An observation that is no less per-
tinent when we come to consider the Arctic region and the manner in which politi-
cal representatives of Arctic coastal states appeal to banal and mundane
geographical divisions to reinforce their polar credentials. This is particularly perti-
nent when it comes to the manner in which the category of the “coastal state” is
invoked to naturalize geopolitical and geographical connections to the Arctic
region.
The appeal of this thesis to political geographers, contemporary historians and
sociologists is not hard to fathom. Billig’s attentiveness to the unremarkable chimed
well with a growing interest in the popular geopolitics of nationalism, which
included an interest in both material culture (e.g. ﬂags and stamps), practices (stand-
ing to attention by a ﬂag) and discourses (e.g. American exceptionalism). Without
citing Billig’s work directly, moreover, the geographer James Sidaway penned a
30M.J. Penrose “ ‘Mon pays ce n’est pas un pays’ full stop: The Concept of Nation as a
Challenge to the Nationalist Aspirations of the Part Quebecois,” Political Geography 13
(1994): 161–81. For example, J. Sidaway, “Banal Geopolitics Resumed,” Antipode 35
(2003): 645–51; Billig, Banal Nationalism.
31Benwell and Dodds “Argentine Territorial Nationalism Revisited.”
32Billig, Banal Nationalism, 68.
33Penrose, “ ‘Mon pays ce n’est pas un pays.’ ”
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number of short interventions in the journal Antipode, focusing on what he termed
“banal geopolitics”, and highlighted the role that speech acts and visual accoutre-
ments, such as maps, play in reproducing routine descriptions of western nation-
states and others, especially at times of crisis and conﬂict, such as the Kosovo,
Afghanistan and Iraq wars.34
Other scholars have considered how Billig’s focus on the banal might be used
to think critically about the role of “the little things,” like the use of the “we/them”
dichotomy alongside material objects to reproduce certain notions of the national in
polities. In that respect, a key aspect of this thread of research has been to move
away from the broader theorizing of nationalism and instead focus on the mundane
and the miniature. It is within everyday life that banal and hot forms of nationalism
blend and blur with one another in ways not controlled exclusively by either the
state and state-sanctioned authorities or the media. Instead, we might more proﬁt-
ably ask how nationalism is embedded, resisted, rejected in a messy and unexpected
way, which may actually take us (in the sense of both citizens and academics) by
surprise.
Our analysis of Iceland of being a “coastal state” is used to explore the elite
and popular contexts further, in which Icelandic territorial nationalism is repro-
duced. We acknowledge in this article that more attention is given to ofﬁcial docu-
ments, public speeches and published sources but want to articulate a broader
agenda, which will in the future take in more ethnographic research relating to daily
practices, including interviews with Icelandic citizens (and others residing in Arctic
coastal states). In doing so, our proposed agenda moves beyond the identiﬁcation of
mundane “texts” (such as maps, speeches and adverts) as static exemplars of Icelan-
dic nationalism, to thinking more sensitively about variations (e.g. temporal and
spatial ones) in the production and consumption of these representations. Also sali-
ent here is Martin Müller’s intervention regarding the ways in which discourses,
practices and the everyday co-constitute one another in the formation of geopolitical
identities. Thus, we accept the “centrality of representations in the media, in gov-
ernment documents or politicians’ speeches as formative of identity,” but also
remain attuned to “the enactment of identities by ordinary people and in micro con-
texts.” If nothing else we should not assume that Icelandic citizens are “moved” in
the same ways by appeals by foreign ministers (to take one example) to recognize
the Arctic region in national identity discourses and practices.35 The notion of
everyday nationalism as posited by Rhys Jones and Peter Merriman explicitly
avoids dividing nationalism into “banal”, and what Billig originally deﬁned as
“hot” varieties, instead placing emphasis on the diverse contexts and ways in which
such geopolitical symbols are constructed and read.36 Different forms of nationalism
are understood to overlap, given the potential for individuals and groups to read
and react to geopolitical discourses/practices in a multitude of ways.
The politics of identity and recognition
What underlies Iceland’s current focus on the Arctic and its push for being
recognized as a coastal state is not only its stakeholding claim in a region of
34For example, Sidaway, “Banal Geopolitics Resumed.”
35Müller “Reconsidering the Concept,” 335.
36Jones and Merriman “Hot, Banal and Everyday Nationalism.”
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ever-increasing geopolitical importance. It has also to be seen within the context of
a continuing search for a new foreign policy identity after the Cold War and the ter-
mination, in 2006, of a 55-year United States military presence in Iceland.37 Instead
of viewing Iceland either as a geostrategic ﬁxture and/or an air/naval bridge, as was
the case during the Cold War, Icelandic political elites were suddenly forced to
rethink Iceland’s geopolitical territoriality and allegiances. It has not been a question
of reducing Iceland’s commitment to Western institutional structures but more of
widening and re-imagining Iceland’s geostrategic position. Initially, the most logical
and likely outcome of the “politics of transition” was seen by Icelandic political
elites as a shift toward the European Union, setting in train an imaginative geo-
graphical recasting of the country and its regional environment. No longer part of
US forward defence parameters, Iceland was, thus, poised to look more toward Eur-
ope for a strategic partnership to complement its strong economic relationship with
the European Union (over 70% of Iceland’s exports go to EU states). Thus, in
2009, Iceland submitted its EU membership application after experiencing a major
economic and political crisis, when its banking system collapsed under the weight
of reckless over-expansion abroad, institutional weaknesses and global economic
turmoil. The EU application signiﬁed a belated and desperate effort to restore eco-
nomic stability at home and political backing abroad in a time of national crisis. It
did not, however, reﬂect a domestic political consensus.
While Iceland has always identiﬁed socially and culturally with Europe, and, for
some time, been closely tied institutionally to the European Union through the
European Economic Area (EEA) – together with Norway and Lichtenstein – and
the Schengen border control scheme, the EU membership bid is highly controver-
sial. Indeed, it is far from certain that an EU accession treaty will be approved in a
referendum. Scepticism about the viability of the European project, in general, is
not the main reason. Rather, economic nationalism and national identity narratives
have reinforced the tendency to frame the Icelandic debate over Europe in sover-
eignty terms – often with a very strong sense that Iceland should not allow its sov-
ereignty to become either graduated or diminished in its dealings with something
frequently imagined as a colossus. The EU’s common ﬁshery policy is the main tar-
get, for it would infringe on Iceland’s full control over its ﬁshing grounds, the back-
bone of its economy.38 In the 1950s and 1970s, Iceland fought three “Cod Wars”
with the British over the issue of ﬁshing limits before gaining the international rec-
ognition of its 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. Evoking the politics of memory,
any weakening of Iceland’s sovereignty in this area generates stiff domestic political
resistance, especially when it is imagined as an active violation of Iceland’s
maritime borders.
In contrast to the divisions over the European project, there is a cross-political
consensus on prioritizing the Arctic in Icelandic foreign policy. It is based on the
belief that Iceland will play an increasingly important role in Arctic geopolitics
because of its location, proximity to natural resources, potential new sea-lanes and
37See Ingimundarson, Rebellious Ally, 155–73. There is also a popular geopolitics to this
issue; see the crime novel by the bestselling Icelandic writer Arnaldur Indridason, Operation
Napoleon, trans. Victoria Cribb (London: Harvill Secker, 2010), which deals with Iceland’s
uneasy geopolitical relationship with the US.
38One of the strongest sources of opposition to the EU negotiations was the Icelandic Fish-
ing Vessels Owners Union, which was eager to retain inﬂuence over a domestic ﬁsheries
governance system that grants them control of tradable ﬁshing quotas.
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trade routes.39 Hence the emphasis on having a decision-making role on a par with
that of the Arctic Five and a re-imagination of the country as an Arctic hub as
opposed to an outpost for others. When the geopolitical and media spotlight was
turned on the Arctic in response to the Russian North Pole ﬂag-planting spectacle
in 2007, Icelandic politicians were already reworking historical and geographical
mythologies to create viable political narratives in the present. References to the
term “Arctic Mediterranean” – coined a century ago by the explorer Vilhjálmur
Stefánsson who was of Icelandic extraction40 – were used to evoke future material
gains based on the prospective opening of new trans-Arctic trade routes as a result
of Arctic ice-melting.41 Thus, Icelandic ofﬁcials appropriated, reformulated and
repackaged Stefánsson’s early-twentieth-century vision of all-year commercial sea
routes around the Arctic, with ports, naval stations and weather stations on strategi-
cally placed islands. Iceland was portrayed as an ideal trans-Arctic commercial hub
– a centre for reception, distribution and trans-shipment – with the linking of the
North Atlantic with the Paciﬁc.42 This is represented as complementing, and indeed
consolidating, Iceland’s coastal state credentials within the Arctic Ocean region.
Others want to receive, distribute and trans-ship precisely because of Iceland’s geo-
graphical location and potential connectivity.43 Iceland’s place in the “efﬂuent of
the Arctic Ocean” just so happens to coincide with existing and, more importantly,
anticipated shipping lanes and networks of economic activity in the future.
Such representations can be traced to domestic political posturing – not in itself
to be understood as trivial, but rather to touch upon discursive/practice-based behav-
iours. They partly reﬂected a nostalgic Cold War desire to be part of an elite Arctic
club, and be associated with a place of renewed strategic relevance and economic
potential. Making exaggerated claims about Iceland’s special position in the Arctic
and/or the impending opening of new sea-lanes is also double-edged – running a
risk of alienating other Arctic “coastal states” and contributing to discourses and
practices associated with “Arctic geopolitics”, especially ones that are judged culpa-
ble of reproducing understandings of the Arctic region as being characterized as
resource rich and prone to military competition. While it has put some emphasis on
making Iceland a global trans-shipment hub, it has highlighted the potential of
39See Icelandic Foreign Ministry, “Fyrir stafni haf;” Icelandic Foreign Ministry, “Ísinn
brotinn;” Icelandic Foreign Ministry, “Ísland á norðurslóðum.”
40Paradoxically, Stefansson was ambivalent about whether Iceland was part of the Arctic
region (for further details, see Palsson, Travelling Passions). Thanks to one of the referees
for this observation.
41It is worth noting that physical scientists and oceanographers use the term “Arctic Mediter-
ranean” in a different context to refer to the subterranean geographies of the Arctic basin.
The region being deﬁned as “The Arctic Mediterranean consists of the Arctic Ocean and the
Nordic seas (the Norwegian Sea, the Iceland Sea and the Greenland Sea). In this region,
cooling and brine rejection increase the density of upper layer waters sufﬁciently so that they
may descend to intermediate (500–1000 m) or deep levels. These ‘ventilated’ waters leave
the Arctic Mediterranean as deep ‘overﬂow’ across the Greenland–Scotland Ridge into the
North Atlantic.” See S. Østerhus et al., “Observed Transport Estimates.”
42See “Opening Address” by Valgerður Sverrisdóttir, former Icelandic Foreign Minister, in
Icelandic Foreign Ministry, “Fyrir stafni haf;” see also Ingimundarson, “Iceland’s Security
Policy,” 84 –85.
43There is an interesting argument to pursue about how Icelandic volcanic disruption to
European–North American air links in April 2010 highlighted not only Iceland’s “bridging”
role, but also its geographical centrality to two of the most important continental spaces of
the contemporary world economy.
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forthcoming oil exploration in its EEZ zone – in the so-called Dragon Zone – near
Jan Mayen.44 In addition, it is pushing the economic geographical idea of making
Iceland a service centre in connection with Icelandic and Norwegian oil exploration
near the island. The same applies to potential natural resource extraction and tour-
ism in Greenland. Not all of its initiatives designed to strengthen Iceland’s represen-
tation as an Arctic state have met with success. Thus, the Arctic Council favoured
Tromsø over Reykjavik when deciding on the location of an Arctic Council Secre-
tariat in 2011. And the proposal for establishing an international Arctic Search and
Rescue Center in Iceland has so far not been backed in any tangible way by other
Arctic Ocean coastal states. Two examples, perhaps, of how appeals to Iceland’s
coastal state status do not resonate as forcefully as the Icelandic government might
have hoped (rather than expected).
Worries about the potential effects of climate change on the marine environment
in the “North” help to assemble and enact Iceland’s Arctic policy. So far the prac-
tice of territoriality, that is, Icelandic references to “action” and “work” – as part of
its self-deﬁnition as a coastal state – have highlighted the discursive and interna-
tional division of labour to respond to Arctic problems rather than speciﬁc material
contribution. Given its small size and the impact of the banking collapse, Iceland
will not be able to invest much in surveillance and resource evaluation, even if it
has started the oil exploration licensing process for foreign companies in the
Dragon Zone. But there is awareness in Iceland that oil and gas shipments do not
only offer future economic opportunities, but also environmental risks, especially
the danger of oil spills.45 Indeed, given the material stakes here, it is quite possible
that Iceland will, in the future, seek ways to securitize its ﬁshing grounds, insisting
on far stricter rules of transport routes in international waters. Increased surveillance
involvement of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in the Arctic is seen
as a step in the right direction. The same applies to the Arctic Council’s 2011
agreement on Search and Rescue and its plans for another agreement on oil pollu-
tion in the Arctic. If a serious environmental accident occurs in Icelandic waters,
one option is to attempt to enforce regulatory changes through unilateral means if
multilateral mechanisms – such as the Law of the Sea – are not considered ade-
quate. But, in general, the Icelandic emphasis is primarily on cooperation among
the eight Arctic states within the institutional framework of the Arctic Council.
All these factors have pushed the Arctic to the centre stage of Iceland’s foreign
policy agenda. The aim is to enhance Iceland’s position in the “North” by highlight-
ing its dual national identity as a North Atlantic and Arctic state. The policy is
under the inﬂuence of Norway’s “High North” strategy. To the Norwegians, the
“High North” encompasses, geographically, the area stretching from the Barents
Sea to the Greenland Sea.46 From a political perspective, it involves Norwegian
relations with neighbouring states, such as Sweden, Finland and Russia; Nordic
cooperation; the relationship with the United States and Canada through the Arctic
Council, and the ties with the European Union as part of the Northern Dimension,
that is, the common policy and political venue of the European Union, Norway,
44See Orkustofnun [Icelandic National Energy Authority], “Oil and Gas Exploration.”
45Under the Swedish chairmanship, the Arctic Council will be concentrating on developing
more robust oil spill procedures for the Arctic region in the aftermath of the legally binding
search and rescue agreement signed in 2011.
46Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, High North.
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Iceland and the Russian Federation. Norway’s High North strategy shows how lan-
guage (and practices such as the Norwegian Foreign Minister giving frequent
speeches pointing to a map to explain to his audience the geographical extent of
the “High North”) is used to deﬁne a geographic area in a political way through a
merger of two narratives on the European “High North” and the “Arctic”.47 What
motivates this policy is Norway’s attempt to strengthen its presence in the North,
for example, on the question of Svalbard, not the least its disputed “Fishery Protec-
tion Zone”. Another is to maintain political stability in Norway’s relations with its
much larger neighbour, Russia, and ﬁnally to encourage and sustain resource-led
development in the northern territories of Norway – onshore and offshore.48
Like Norway, Iceland wants to deﬁne its place in the “North” in broad political
and geographic terms. As an attempt to project claims to national identity, such an
approach is not without contradictions. Icelandic nationalism has traditionally cen-
tred less on the North than on what has been considered Western identity formation.
Historically, there has been a tension between a preponderant commitment to a
Western nationalist trajectory, and a Third World anti-colonial narrative. From the
1950s until the 1970s, these two strands of nationalism merged in the “Cod Wars”
against the British over the extension of Iceland’s ﬁshery limits.49
On the one hand, there was a strong inﬂuence of the classical Western national-
ist model: to strengthen political and economic independence and to protect Ice-
land’s borders – in this case, the ﬁshery grounds around the island – by expanding
the ﬁshery zone. In other words, to be considered an efﬁcacious and internationally
respected “coastal state”. Yet it was anti-traditional in the sense that it was rooted
in a modernity discourse, which, was by deﬁnition ambivalent in its very origin. As
Paul de Man put it, “modernity exists in the form of a desire to wipe out whatever
came earlier, in the hope of reaching at least a point that could be called a true
present, a point of origin that marks a new departure.”50 In the Icelandic case, it
represented an attempt to do away with any notions of national backwardness.
On the other hand, political elites used an anti-Western discourse based on Third
World nationalism against colonialism and on the reiﬁcation of historical traditions.51
This line of argument proved powerful and effective, even if it was problematic
because Icelanders did not, as one of the richest nations in the world, identify them-
selves with the developing world. But what made it discursively viable was that the
Icelandic economic system was so dependent on ﬁshing and was ﬁghting a country
with an imperialist and colonial record. When it came to the extension of ﬁshery
limits in global politics, the most forceful advocates of such territorial nationalism
were Third World states. Hence, it also suited Iceland’s economic interests to tie its
struggle against the British to the wider politics of decolonization.
Such a materialist approach has always taken precedence over any Icelandic
propagation of territorial Romanticism. Indeed, the Arctic has never had an exalted
place in Iceland’s political and cultural imagination. While Iceland has been
47Støre, “Iceland and Norway.”
48See Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, “Regjeringens nordområdestrategi;” see also
Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs “Nordområdene: Visjon og virkemidler” (Oslo: Min-
istry for Foreign Affairs, 18 November 2011).
49Ingimundarson, Rebellious Ally,” 99–134.
50De Man, Blindness and Insight, 244.
51See, for example, van den Berghe, “Ethnicity and the Sociological Debate;” Hobsbawm,
Nations and Nationalism since 1780, 169–70; Chatterjee, Nation and Its Fragments.
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committed to a northern identity, it has traditionally paid limited attention to the
Arctic, except when clear economic interests have been at stake. It did, for example,
not become a party to the Svalbard Treaty until 1994 after a dispute with Norway
over Icelandic ﬁshing in the Barents Sea. Iceland has rejected Norway’s assumption
of the 200-mile “Fishery Protection Zone” around Svalbard, arguing that the non-
discriminatory rights to practice peaceful economic activities of the parties of the
Svalbard Treaty apply. Thus, in “normal times”, national projections of Iceland as
developed country have always been dominant. And it is precisely for this reason
that Icelanders have not wanted to identify themselves too closely to their “less
developed” regional Northern and Arctic neighbours. In this regard, the 2008 bank-
ing collapse proved to be a very hard pill to swallow for Icelandic political elites,
for it destabilized such national identities and self-perceptions of Iceland as a highly
developed and modern state.52 Betraying a sense of vulnerability and identity loss –
when Iceland was forced to accept an International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout –
the then Prime Minister Geir Haarde claimed that he had extracted a promise from
the IMF that Iceland would not be like, what he termed, a “Third World” state.53
As was the case during the “Cod Wars”, this line of argument tends only to be
modiﬁed in Icelandic political discourse when overshadowed by economic interests.
When it comes to whaling, for example, Icelanders have had no problem mixing
the historical rights of “indigenous peoples” with their own whale-hunting policy
for “scientiﬁc purposes”.54 And given the likelihood of large oil deposits in Green-
land’s Arctic waters, they have placed much emphasis on the rights of Arctic
“indigenous peoples”. To be sure, Iceland has traditionally supported their rights
and maintained good relations with Greenland. But it is clear that in Iceland’s Arc-
tic policy an enhanced importance has been accorded to “indigenous peoples” in
the past few years – not least because it has been useful to highlight a geopolitics
of potential exclusion. Thus, in its strenuous ﬁght against the establishment of a for-
malized Arctic Five, Iceland criticized the meetings in Ilulissat and Chelsea not only
on the grounds that they excluded the other three Arctic states, but also because
they bypassed the Arctic’s “indigenous peoples”. Given the sensitivity of the issue,
even US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton publicly reprimanded the Canadian
government for not inviting those stakeholders.55
Conclusion
Being recognized as a “coastal state” is primarily geared towards an international
audience, especially the Arctic Five. It is seen as a means to strengthen Iceland’s
52See Ingimundarson, “ ‘Crisis of Afﬂuence’.”
53Gunnarsson: Umsátrið, 71.
54The 2011 reaction of the Icelandic government to the possibility of US sanctions on Ice-
land for hunting wales is a case in point. In a statement, the Foreign Ministry argued that
the “US authorities are not consistent when they criticize Iceland for its ﬁn whale hunting,”
which is “no less sustainable than US bowhead whaling” off the coast of Alaska. What was
left unstated was that US whale hunting is conducted by nine different Alaskan “indigenous”
communities. See “US May Impose Sanctions on Iceland for Hunting Whales”, Bloomberg,
20 July 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-20/u-s-may-impose-sanctions-on-ice-
land-for-hunting-whales-1-.html.
55“Clinton Rebuke Overshadow Canada’s Arctic Meeting”, Reuters, 29 March 2010, httpp://
www.reuters.com/articl/idUSTRE62S4ZP20100330.
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position in the Arctic Council, and in its dealings with other Arctic coastal states.
Geographical descriptions and metaphors are being put to work to ensure that Ice-
land is understood as a “coastal state” and, as such, is recognized by others as note-
worthy. There has, in fact, been limited debate or discussion – in the domestic
arena – about this point, in particular, or Iceland’s Arctic policy, in general. The
Arctic does not evoke any sense of nationalistic passions or controversy. In this
sense, the Icelandic parliamentary resolution ﬁts well with Billig’s notion of banal
nationalism, where the ﬂag remains “unwaved”, and where the assumptions of
nationalism are deeply entrenched. The coastal state argument reﬂects continuous
efforts by the Icelandic Foreign Ministry to insert and naturalize ideas within the
domestic arena based on perceived national interests in the Arctic region. It is part
of what Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger saw as a key function of nationalism:
to socialize by inculcating beliefs, values systems and conventions of behaviour
through an identiﬁcation with a “community” and its institutions.56 The focus is not
on immediate gratiﬁcation – even if politicians are touting the Dragon Zone as a
potentially lucrative venture. The Icelandic government and the media have
portrayed Iceland’s Arctic interests in materialist terms, with emphasis on potential,
if still unfulﬁlled gains based on Iceland’s geostrategic position.
The meaning and effects of performativity or speech acts depend on how it is
displayed and dramatized. Since Iceland is not challenging UNCLOS with its
coastal state demand, it has not generated protests among the other Arctic stake-
holding countries. Yet, so far, the Arctic Five have not shown any signs that they
will recognize Iceland as a coastal state in the sense of inviting its representatives
to its meetings as an equal member. They know that any formal Arctic Five meet-
ings will be met by vocal opposition from Iceland and more tempered responses
from the other two Arctic states excluded from them, Sweden and Finland, which,
unlike Iceland, have no Arctic coastlines. This resistance will surely not stop the
Arctic Five project, but it could unsettle it in terms of how a select group of coastal
states attempt to “shore up” their sovereign interests and trans-Arctic inﬂuence over
the Arctic Ocean. And it will remind both international and domestic audiences of
the essence of Arctic geopolitics – the inside/outside divide and its potential for
friction, not only between the eight Arctic states themselves, but also between them
and external actors – and point to the sites, at which the border function of inclu-
sion/exclusion takes places, where it is performed and where it is fought. For us,
these developments (and they are ongoing) remind us that there are multiple under-
standings of the Arctic region and that we have an opportunity to explore in more
depth how terms such as “coastal state” are used to build, claim, deﬁne and even
resist national and circumpolar identity projects.57
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